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Abstract 
The establishment of the UK Department for International Development in 1997, and 
the evolution of the UK’s foreign aid policies, has provoked international interest as a 
possible model for other countries to follow. 
The UK now combines in a single government department not only the delivery of all 
overseas aid, but also responsibility for analyzing the impact on developing countries of 
other government policies, such as trade, environment and prevention of conflict. The 
department is led by a Cabinet-level minister. It has a remit to articulate the UK’s long-
term security, economic and political interests in helping to build a more stable and 
prosperous world, and to ensure that this long-term goal is considered alongside the 
more immediately pressing concerns of political, security and commercial interests.  It 
has benefited from a sharp focus on its long-term mission to reduce poverty overseas.   
Within a few years, the new Department has established a reputation for itself, and for 
the UK Government, as a leader in development thinking and practice.   
This paper describes the institutional changes in more detail, and considers how they 





The Center for Global Development is an independent think tank that works to reduce global poverty 
and inequality through rigorous research and active engagement with the policy community. This 
Working Paper was made possible in part by funding from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.  
Use and dissemination of this Working Paper is encouraged, however reproduced copies may not be 
used for commercial purposes. Further usage is permitted under the terms of the Creative Commons 
License. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the 











Reforming Development Assistance 

















The author is grateful to Sir Brian Barder, Sally Ethelston, Tony German, John Hicklin, 
Ruth Levine, Mark Lowcock, Lawrence Macdonald, Richard Manning, Simon Maxwell, 
David Mepham, Todd Moss, Grethe Petersen, Judith Randel and Sir John Vereker for 
comments on an earlier draft.  The views expressed, and all errors and omissions, are my 
own.  This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the Center for Global 
Development, or the Department for International Development.  
2 1. Introduction 
 
“It is one of the proudest achievements of the Government that we have not merely 
introduced the International Development Bill, but have increased aid and development 
money as a proportion of our national income. …. I believe that our obligations do not 
stop at these shores. Indeed, it is not merely right, but is in our long-term interest to offer 
a helping hand out of poverty to the poorest regions of the world.”    
Tony Blair, House of Commons, 7 March 2001.
2  
 
In 1997, the incoming Labour Government established a new Department for 
International Development (DFID), with responsibility for the $6bn aid budget and other 
aspects of UK development policy, led by its own Cabinet Minister.
3 
In the subsequent eight years, the new Department established a reputation for itself, and 
for the UK Government, as a leader in development thinking and practice.  A 2005 study 
for the Canadian Government found that, “Ten years ago, DFID was considered a 
middle-of-the-pack development agency. Today it is generally considered to be the best in 
the world.”
4  DFID was described by The Economist as “a model for other rich 
countries.”
5  The non-governmental organisation Oxfam described DFID as the “best 
bilateral development agency.”  More new recruits to the management track of the civil 
service now apply to join DFID than to the traditional first choices, the Foreign Office 
and Treasury, combined. The overhaul of foreign assistance institutions and policies has 
been described by Tony Blair as one of the Labour Government’s proudest achievements, 
and may be seen in time as one of its greatest legacies.      
This paper summarises the institutional changes and policies that led to the establishment 
of the Department for International Development and its reputation as a global leader in 
development since 1997. It considers the objectives of policy-makers in establishing the 
new structure, the extent to which these have been met, and the challenges in the years 
ahead. It draws lessons for other countries considering similar reforms. 
 
2. Development assistance and the colonies 1929-1961 
2.1 Before World War II 
The British aid program is rooted in colonial history. Until the 1920s, the British 
Government took the view that colonial administrations were responsible for maintaining 
law and order and that they should meet the costs of administration and such social 
services as were provided from any revenues that could be raised locally.  Colonies were 
not encouraged to look to the UK government for financial or economic aid, and there 
were no programs for colonial development. Any aid to colonies was voted by Parliament 
annually, and was generally limited to temporary emergencies.   
It was not until 1929 that the British Government accepted any legal responsibility for 
providing financial assistance to the colonies. The Colonial Development Act of 1929 
was intended mainly to reduce unemployment in the United Kingdom by promoting 
3 industry and trade.
6 It established a Colonial Development Fund which was not to exceed 
£1 million (about $70 million in 2004 prices) in any one year to support agriculture and 
industry in the colonies and in so doing promote "commerce with or industry in the 
United Kingdom.”  Funds were allocated by Colonial Development Advisory Committee 
after a systematic examination of all schemes and projects put forward by colonial 
governments.  The Committee generally felt that the Act did not permit aid for social 
services, for recurrent expenditure or for projects that would not result in any gains for the 
UK.  
Between 1935 and 1938 a wave of social unrest rippled across the Colonies. The Colonial 
Office became convinced that the rapid succession of disturbances in Trinidad, Barbados, 
and Jamaica were the result of low wages, high unemployment and poor housing and 
sanitary conditions, and feared similar disturbances in other colonies which had similar 
problems. It became clear that the restrictions in the Colonial Development Act of 1929 
were not sustainable. The result was the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, 
passed in wartime by a coalition government, which increased funds to £5 million a year 
(about $300 million in 2004 prices) and extended the purposes of the Colonial 
Development Act to include the welfare of the subjects of the colonies. 
2.2 Post-war development policy 
The post-war Labour Government took the view that the UK Government should play a 
substantial role in assisting the development of the colonies. The Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act of 1945 replaced the two previous Acts, and increased aid to £120m 
(about $6 billion in 2004 prices) over ten years. This longer commitment was intended to 
allow colonial governments to plan long-term schemes of public works, social services 
and agriculture.
7  Each Colonial Government was required to prepare a Ten Year Plan, in 
consultation with representatives of the local population.  A large proportion of the 
money that went into each Ten Year Program was provided out of local revenues and 
loans: the British Government sought to minimize the amount funded by aid “so as to 
prevent even a suggestion of political pressure from the United Kingdom.” 
8 
The Overseas Resources Act of 1947 established two Development Corporations, a 
Colonial Development Corporation, to operate in the Colonies, and an Overseas Food 
Corporation, to function anywhere in the world.  The objectives of the Corporations were 
to bring about a “speedier and more widespread development of our territories overseas 
for the benefit of the Colonial peoples, whose low standard of living can only be raised by 
greater use of their natural resources…” The Colonial Development and Welfare Act 
and the Overseas Resources Act established the United Kingdom’s first systematic aid 
programs to be operated not mainly in the interests of the donor. 
3. The evolution of policy 1960-1997 
3.1 Changed thinking about the role of aid 
After World War II, there was a significant change in thinking about the role of foreign 
aid. The success of the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan
9) generated 
optimism that the combination of capital and technical assistance could transform 
economies in a very short time.
10   
4 Though it is popular today, it is worth recalling that it took some time and a considerable 
effort by President Truman and his colleagues to secure US public support for the 
Marshall Plan.  The State Department organized a large-scale and well-funded public 
education program, including providing trips to Europe for many members of Congress to 
see for themselves the need for U.S.-sponsored reconstruction. In the end, it was 
increasing Soviet intransigence and the communist take-over of Czechoslovakia in 
February 1948 that eventually persuaded Congress to approve the original Marshall Plan 
appropriation.
11 
The break up of the British, French and other European empires created a number of 
poor, independent countries, and it became increasingly unsustainable for them to restrict 
development aid only to the remaining colonies. The UK Government declared in 1958 
that aid would be extended to former colonies that were members of the Commonwealth, 
and some non-Commonwealth countries.  The British began to offer a combination of 
budgetary grants and technical assistance grants, concessionary loans, and loans under the 
Export Guarantee Act. The Colonial Office, which was responsible for managing the 
colonies and the process of decolonisation, worked under a guiding principle of the 
‘paramountcy of interests of the colonial peoples,’ under which it had a duty to press for 
these interests within Government even against Britain’s other interests. Many officials 
who joined the Colonial Office were idealistic, supportive of aid and in favor of 
multilateral institutions. 
As well as increasing support for the idea of foreign aid, the Marshall Plan also led 
directly to the establishment of an important international development institution. The 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) had been formed in 1948 by 
the recipients of aid from the Marshall Plan, and in 1960 a Development Assistance 
Group was established within OEEC as a forum for consultations among aid donors on 
assistance to less developed countries.  In March 1961, the Development Assistance 
Group agreed the Common Aid Effort (see Box 1 below).  Later that year, the OEEC 
became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); its new 
emphasis on promoting development was epitomized by the rapid establishment within its 
structure of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which grew out of the 
Development Assistance Group.  
The Marshall Plan therefore had a strong influence because it promoted the idea of 
economic cooperation and illustrated its possible effectiveness, but also because it left an 
important organizational legacy in the DAC.  The US Government played an important 
leadership role continuously from the Marshall Plan to the establishment of the 
Development Assistance Committee, which was chaired by US Ambassadors from its 





5 Box 1: Resolution of the Common Aid Effort 
12 
 
RESOLUTION OF THE COMMON AID EFFORT 
(adopted by Development Assistance Group, 29 March 1961, London) 
 
The Development Assistance Group: 
Conscious of the aspirations of the less-developed countries to achieve improving 
standards of life for their peoples; 
Convinced of the need to help the less-developed countries help themselves by 
increasing economic, financial and technical assistance and by adapting this 
assistance to the requirements of the recipient countries;  
Agree to recommend to Members that they should make it their common objective to 
secure an expansion of the aggregate volume of resources made available to the less 
developed countries and to improve their effectiveness; 
Agree that assistance provided on an assured and continuing basis would make the 
greatest contribution to sound economic growth in the less-developed countries; 
Agree that, while private and public finance extended on commercial terms is 
valuable and should be encouraged, the needs of some of the less-developed countries 
at the present time are such that the common aid effort should provide for expanded 
assistance in the form of grants or loans on favourable terms, including long 
maturities where this is justified in order to prevent the burden of external debt from 
becoming too heavy;  
Agree that they will periodically review together both the amount and the nature of 
their contributions to aid programmes, bilateral and multilateral, keeping in mind all 
the economic and other factors that may assist or impede each of them in helping to 
achieve the common objective;  
Agree to recommend that a study should be made of the principles on which 
Governments might most equitably determine their respective contributions to the 
common aid effort having regard to the circumstances of each country, including its 
economic capacity and all other relevant factors;  
Agree that the Chairman, assisted by the Secretariat, shall be invited to give 




Against this background in the early 1960s, a more coherent aid policy was beginning to 
develop within the UK. In 1960, a Treasury White Paper argued that the best way to lift 
poorer nations out of poverty was through economic development.
13 It argued that the 
provision of private capital would be the main catalyst for this but money from the United 
Kingdom Exchequer would continue to provide aid.  A 1963 White Paper took an 
optimistic view of the prospects for developing countries, and described aid as a 
transitory concept.  It supported aid both as a good in itself, but also because it 
encouraged trade.
14 
6 In 1961 the Conservative Government established the Department for Technical 
Cooperation, to consolidate in one place the technical expertise for the colonies that had 
been spread across several government departments.  The Colonial Office was being 
reduced in size as a result of decolonisation, and many of its staff transferred to the 
Department for Technical Cooperation, helping to preserve the expertise that had been 
acquired during the colonial period.  
3.2 The Ministry of Overseas Development 1964-1970 
In 1964, the incoming Labour Government kept a manifesto promise to establish a 
Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM). The ODM brought together the functions of 
the Department of Technical Co-operation and the overseas aid policy functions of the 
Foreign, Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Offices and of other government 
departments. The intention was that this should develop and execute all aspects of 
development policy (not just aid); that it should be separate from the Foreign Office (so 
that development policies were not subordinated to other foreign policy interests); and it 
was to have a planning staff of economists (at a time when economists were rare within 
Government).
15  The first three Ministers of Overseas Development were members of the 
Cabinet.
16 
A new White Paper in 1965 made a case for aid based both on moral duty and on the 
long-term interest of the United Kingdom.
17 Aid was not to be given as a response to 
requests from developing countries, but as a result of a joint effort to identify the needs of 
recipients.  The goal of the new policy was to get the most development effect from aid, 
and so the 1965 White Paper shifted policy towards project-tied aid, with financial terms 
linked to economic conditions in the recipient country.   
The ODM did not live up to the high expectations that had been created.  Aid spending 
rose only slightly during the Labour Government’s term of office, partly because of 
balance of payments and fiscal constraints.  From August 1967 the ministerial office was 
demoted out of the Cabinet, which greatly reduced its leverage within the Government. 
Though the ODM remained a separate government department, it was no longer 
represented in Cabinet. The ODM was always an aid ministry rather than a development 
ministry – it did not have any impact on trade policy or political relationships with 
overseas governments, and even on aid the most important decisions were taken by an 
interdepartmental committee.  It was not able to define a coherent policy agenda: a further 
White Paper in 1967 was largely a progress report, consisting mainly of a detailed 
account of the complexities of the British aid program.
18 
3.3 The Ministry of Overseas Development 1970-1974 
Following the re-election of a Conservative Government in October 1970 the Ministry of 
Overseas Development was incorporated into the Foreign Office, and renamed the 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA).  The ODA was overseen by a Minister of 
State in the Foreign Office,
19 who was accountable to the Foreign Secretary.
20   
In practice, there was little change as a result of this institutional shift. Though it was now 
a section of the Foreign Office, the ODA was relatively self-contained with its own 
Minister, and the policies, procedures and staff remained largely intact.   
7 3.4 Re-establishment of the Ministry of Overseas Development 1974-1979 
When it was returned to office in 1974, the Labour Government announced that there 
would once again be a separate Ministry of Overseas Development, with its own minister, 
though, as in the period 1967-1970, the minister would not be a member of the Cabinet.  
The new Government proposed a significant change in aid policy, set out in the 1975 
White Paper, The Changing Emphasis of Britain’s Aid Policies: More Help for the 
Poorest.  British aid was to be focused on the poorest countries, many of whom had been 
hard hit by the rise in oil prices, the food crisis, and a deterioration in their terms of trade. 
Aid was to be allocated to have “the most effect in alleviating the worst poverty over the 
long term.”  The priorities would be: 
“(a) to give an increasing emphasis in our bilateral aid to the poorest countries, 
especially those in the group most seriously affected by the rise in the price of oil 
and other commodities;” 
“(b) to give special emphasis to programmes oriented towards the poorest groups 
within these countries, and especially to rural development;” 
“(c) to promote situations in which British concessional aid funds can best serve 
to stimulate matching contributions from other governments, and to encourage the 
deployment of such aid through both multilateral and bilateral channels towards 
the poorest countries.”
21 
Though the White Paper played down the extent of the change that this entailed, this was 
a genuinely new focus on poverty. The White Paper adopted a ‘basic needs’ approach, 
identified the rural poor as the main group to be brought out of poverty and committed the 
UK to increasing the resources devoted to the agricultural sector.  The White Paper also 
recognized the importance of international institutions, including a substantial section on 
Europe, and it discussed the importance of international trade policy decisions and 
investment as well as aid.   
Once again, the evolution of the aid program did not live up to the policy aspirations set 
out in the White Paper.  An important weakness of the 1975 White Paper was that it did 
not lift the constraint that UK aid could not, in general, be spent on meeting local costs. 
Aid projects often had to be selected not for their development benefits, but because they 
could be designed in such a way as to have a high proportion of UK content.  For 
example, the Indonesia program had to concentrate on groundwater projects because 
these were the only identifiable rural development activities that would use UK goods and 
services (such as consultants, drilling equipment and pumps.)  The problem of local costs 
was not solved until exchange controls were abolished in 1979. 
From June 1975 the powers of the Minister for Overseas Development were formally 
transferred to the Foreign Secretary.
22  From December 1976, after the resignation of 
Reginald Prentice, the Minister for Overseas Development was no longer a member of the 
Cabinet. Though the Overseas Development Ministry remained technically a separate 
government department, administratively distinct from the Foreign Office, this meant that 
in practice development was not given a separate voice within the government. 
8 In 1977, partly to shore up its difficult relations with UK business, the government 
introduced the Aid and Trade Provision (ATP). This enabled aid to be linked to non-
concessionary export credits, with both aid and export credits tied to procurement of 
British goods and services.  Pressure for this provision from UK businesses, and the 
Department of Trade and Industry, arose in part because of the introduction of French 
mixed credit programs, which had begun to offer French Government support from aid 
funds for exports, including for projects in countries to which France had not previously 
given substantial aid.
23  Though the amounts were initially capped at five percent of aid 
spending, the effect of ATP was to bias aid toward higher-income countries and more 
capital-intensive projects, and the developmental impact criterion for project approval 
was only superficially applied. 
During the 1974-1979 Labour Government, the ODA had institutional independence, an 
ambitious policy agenda, and high-level political support. There was a reasonably 
generous increase in aid resources during this time, from 0.37% to 0.51% of national 
income, despite the government’s precarious fiscal position. Yet the department failed to 
establish itself firmly within government, could not protect the aid program from being 
distorted by commercial objectives, and was unable to influence broader government 
policies that impacted on poor countries.  To a large extent this was because the 
department was not working within a supportive Whitehall environment, and was not able 
to create one.
24  At the same time, chronic pressure on the balance of payments prevented 
the adoption of policies that separated aid from the promotion of UK exports.  
3.5 Development policies under the Conservatives 1979-1997 
Following the election of the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher in 1979, the 
ministry was transferred back to the Foreign Office, as a functional wing again named 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA).  The ODA continued to be represented in 
Cabinet by the Foreign Secretary while the Minister for Overseas Development, who had 
day-to-day responsibility for development matters, held the rank of Minister of State 
within the Foreign Office.  
New legislation, the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980, changed little, 
affirming the Government’s broad powers to use aid funds for a wide variety of purposes.  
While the new Government did not publish a new White Paper on overseas development, 
there was nonetheless a significant shift in aid policy under the Conservatives. According 
to one writer, “Few things so quickly symbolized Mrs. Thatcher’s victory in the 1979 
general election as the changes that were soon made to government overseas 
development policy and spending.”
25  The new Minister for Overseas Development, Neil 
Marten, announced in February 1980 that the Government would “give greater weight in the 
allocation of our aid to political, industrial and commercial objectives alongside our basic 
developmental objectives”.
26 The result was a significant expansion of the Aid and Trade 
Provision, and a number of bilateral aid projects designed to support British businesses 
including steel mills, Leyland buses, Hawker-Siddeley aircraft, and Westland 
helicopters.
27  
The statement also set out the Government’s preference for bilateral aid over assistance 
provided through multilateral institutions such as the European Commission. In practice, 
9 however, the difficulty of renegotiating international commitments meant that multilateral 
contributions were harder to reduce in the short term than bilateral aid. This meant that as 
the aid budget fell, the burden of reduction actually fell on the bilateral portion rather than 
the multilateral portion, and so aid provided through multilateral institutions actually rose 
as a share of a declining total.   
The new Government was more candid about its willingness to promote such foreign 
policy objectives as maintaining the UK’s leadership role in the Commonwealth and its 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
28  Thus although developmental concerns 
were still accorded considerable weight and Conservative ministers responsible for aid 
were held in good regard within development circles, there was a real shift of emphasis in 
the conduct of development policy. 
During the 1980s, the balance of payments gradually lost its political significance, partly 
as a result of the abolition of exchange controls in 1979, and partly because of what 
became known as the “Lawson Doctrine” that a current account deficit was not a cause 
for concern if it was the counterpart of a private sector deficit.
29  This reduced the 
Government’s macroeconomic interest in using the aid program to promote British 
exports.  Whereas during the 1980s nearly half the British aid program was restricted to 
goods and services originating in the UK, this was gradually reduced in the 1990s and 
applied to only about 15% of bilateral aid by 1996. 
With the fall in the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the British Government felt 
able to reduce the weight of foreign and economic policy considerations in its aid 
allocations, and instead to link aid more directly to democracy and good governance. In 
June 1990 the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, said that: “Economic success depends to 
a large degree on effective and honest government, political pluralism and observance of 
the rule of law, as well as freer, more open economies."   He called on donors to redirect 
aid towards better governed countries: “While countries tending towards pluralism, 
public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights and market principles 
should be encouraged, those which persisted with repressive policies, corrupt 
management, or with wasteful and discredited economic systems should not expect aid 
donors to support their folly with scarce aid resources which could be used better 
elsewhere.”
30 
The pressure to break the link between aid and commercial considerations was further 
increased in 1994, by a High Court ruling that there was no legal basis for the 
Government to use development funds for primarily commercial purposes.  (The Pergau 
Dam affair is explained in detail in Appendix 1.) Douglas Hurd wrote afterwards, “the 
Pergau episode vexed me greatly at the time. It spoiled what was otherwise a creditable 
record which Lynda Chalker with my support had built up on aid.”
31   
Throughout the whole of its existence, the Overseas Development Administration was 
staffed mainly by home civil servants, although some members of the diplomatic service 
have spent parts of their careers there. At its peak in 1979, it employed 2,300 staff, which 
fell to 1,500 in 1987 as aid budgets were progressively reduced during the Thatcher 
administration.  The rundown of staff numbers was complemented by a reduction in 
overseas manpower. In the mid-1960s there were about 16,000 British staff working on 
10 contract to developing countries, receiving a salary supplement from the Overseas 
Development Ministry.  By 1990, this had been reduced to almost none. 
4. The establishment of the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) 
4.1 The policy context 
Labour had been out of office since 1979, losing four consecutive General Elections.  
Tony Blair became Leader of the Opposition in 1994, and set about modernizing the 
Labour Party’s image and policies, under the banner of New Labour. He removed the 
commitment to public ownership from the party’s constitution. With Gordon Brown, who 
would become Finance Minister in the Labour Government, he neutralized the party’s 
reputation for “tax-and-spend” by promising to spend no more than the Conservatives’ 
planned to spend.   
Under Tony Blair, New Labour described itself as being committed to a pragmatic, 
evidence-based agenda. The 1997 manifesto declared that “New Labour is a party of 
ideas and ideals but not of outdated ideology. What counts is what works. The objectives 
are radical. The means will be modern.” 
32  Labour presented itself as offering an end to 
ideological and class politics. Instead, modern policymaking would be driven by research 
evidence about what was effective in addressing social problems and achieving intended 
outcomes.  In key policy areas such as crime, education and welfare, Labour officials 
talked about their commitment to finding out ‘what works.’ 
One feature of the modernizing agenda was “joined-up government.” New Labour had 
concluded that seemingly intractable problems such as social exclusion, drug addiction 
and crime could not be resolved by any single government department. Instead, such 
problems had to be made the object of a concerted attack using all the arms of 
government - central and local government and public agencies, as well as the private and 
voluntary sectors.
33 
New Labour had a less well-developed foreign policy agenda (except on relations with 
the European Union).  It did, however, have a distinctive foreign policy message that it 
would bring an end to what it called “sleaze,” as it described a number of connections 
between businesses, especially arms exporters, and foreign policy.  This line of attack was 
boosted by the Pergau Dam case in which aid was linked to commercial contracts in a 
way which was subsequently found to be unlawful.
34  In February 1996, Sir Richard Scott 
published the results of his inquiry into the sale of arms to Saddam Hussein’s government 
in Iraq, contrary to the UN sanctions régime then in force.  Robin Cook, Labour Foreign 
Affairs spokesman, enhanced his parliamentary reputation, and nearly brought down the 
Conservative Government, with his charge that the Government had sought to cover up 
its involvement in the illegal arm sales.
35   
For three decades, foreign assistance programs had been influenced by the Cold War, 
during which strategic and security interests had affected the governments’ choice of 
which countries to support and how; and by the need to support the UK’s balance of 
payments, which had encouraged governments to link overseas aid to British exports.   By 
11 the mid-1990s, these pressures had largely disappeared, creating an opportunity for 
Labour to say that it would pursue a foreign policy “with an ethical dimension.”
36 
 
4.2 The Labour Party’s policy on development 
The publication in 1980 of the Brandt Report had led to renewed thinking about the role 
of rich countries in international development. The report argued that aid budgets should 
be increased, focused on the poorest countries, and provided through multilateral 
institutions; and that poor countries should have more influence over the decisions of 
those institutions.
37  During the 1980s and 1990s, independent NGOs and consortiums 
such as the Independent Group on British Aid argued that British aid should be more 
focused on poverty, de-linked from commercial contracts, and part of a broader 
government strategy for international poverty reduction.
38 The Reality of Aid reports, 
published from 1993 onwards, set an agenda for both improving and increasing aid.
39  
Internationally, a new consensus was forming on development policy. In May 1995, 
Development Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies adopted a statement, Development 
Partnerships in the New Global Context, which identified poverty reduction as the central 
challenge and endorsed a comprehensive strategy for tackling it.
40 Furthermore, they 
asked Jim Michel, the American who chaired the Development Assistance Committee, to 
produce a forward-looking reflection on “strategies looking to the next century.” The 
result was a set of concrete, medium-term goals, all based on the recommendations of 
major United Nations conferences, to be pursued on the basis of agreed principles: 
people-centred development, local ownership, global integration and international 
partnership. These goals were presented in the report Shaping the 21st Century which was 
approved by Development Ministers at the DAC High Level Meeting in May 1996.
41  
The objectives agreed in this report became known first as the International Development 
Targets and, after the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000, as the Millennium 
Development Goals.
42 
In 1994-1996, while Labour was in opposition, a Labour Party Policy Commission, 
“Britain in the World,” reviewed Labour’s policies on a broad range of international 
issues, including foreign policy, security, and development.  The Commission, chaired by 
Robin Cook, recommended the creation of separate government department responsible 
for the broad range of international development issues across government, a focus on the 
poorest countries, and giving less weight to commercial and strategic considerations in 
overseas aid. 
These recommendations were a natural fit with the New Labour agenda of policy-making 
based on evidence of what works, and joining-up policy responsibility for difficult 
problems across a number of Government departments. They had the political benefit of 
illustrating how the conduct of foreign policy would change to reduce the influence of 
commercial considerations. They also responded to the agenda for reform of overseas aid 
being advocated internationally, by NGOs, academic and others.  In practice, the Policy 
Commission did not consider the recommendations in detail, and there had been little 
discussion of the proposals by the time they were hardened into party policy. The 
recommendations passed into the Labour Party policy statement on foreign affairs for the 
12 1997 General Election, A Fresh Start for Britain, and in summary form into the 
manifesto:   
 
Labour Party 1997 Manifesto commitment 
Labour believes that we have a clear moral responsibility to help combat global 
poverty. In government we will strengthen and restructure the British aid 
programme and bring development issues back into the mainstream of government 
decision-making. A Cabinet minister will lead a new department of international 
development. 
We will shift aid resources towards programmes that help the poorest people in the 
poorest countries. We reaffirm the UK's commitment to the 0.7 per cent UN aid 
target and in government Labour will start to reverse the decline in UK aid spending. 
We will work for greater consistency between the aid, trade, agriculture and 
economic reform policies of the EU. We will use our leadership position in the EU to 
maintain and enhance the position of the poorest countries during the renegotiation 
of the Lomé Convention. 
We will support further measures to reduce the debt burden borne by the world's 
poorest countries and to ensure that developing countries are given a fair deal in 
international trade. It is our aim to rejoin UNESCO. We will consider how this can be 
done most effectively and will ensure that the cost is met from savings elsewhere.  
In the months before the election in 1997, Foreign Office officials suggested to 
Robin Cook and senior Labour Party officials that it would be a mistake to transfer 
control of the development budget and policy away from the Foreign Office.
43 But at the 
same time, Sir John Vereker, the most senior civil servant at the ODA, was in close 
contact with Clare Short, the Labour Party Shadow Secretary of State for Overseas 
Development; they agreed to argue for the proposed structures and policies of the future 
department.
44 
Immediately following Labour’s victory in the General Election, the new Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, offered the aid portfolio to Clare Short. She was clear that she would not 
accept the job unless she was given a Cabinet post with overall responsibility for 
development policy generally, and not just aid.
45 Ms Short, as Secretary of State for 
International Development, was not only a member of the Cabinet, but also a member of 
several interdepartmental Ministerial Committees.  As the scope of the Department’s 
work was expanded to cover development policy she became a member of Government 
committees on the environment, drug abuse, women's issues, health, and export credits 
including arms sales. One example of the department’s expanded role was that it was 
consulted on the approval of arms export license applications before they were issued.  
4.3 The main changes to development institutions and policy in 1997 
There were three related changes to the structure of UK aid institutions and policy in 
1997: 
•  An independent ministry, the Department for International Development, was 
created, headed by a member of the Cabinet, with responsibility for aid and 
13 development.  Like its predecessors, the new department had responsibility for 
bilateral aid and the funding of multilateral development institutions; but it was 
also given responsibility for ensuring a joined-up development policy across the 
Government as a whole. 
•  Poverty reduction - broadly defined - was identified as the overarching objective 
of aid and development policy; and quantifiable and measurable global targets 
were identified by which to track progress towards this objective, based on the 
International Development Targets (which later became the Millennium 
Development Goals).
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•  The concept of development policy coherence was introduced, which 
acknowledged that managing aid spending was only one (and arguably not the 
most important) part of development policy, and that the new department had a 
legitimate voice in the formulation of government policy in other areas (e.g. trade, 
conflict and foreign relations) for which other government departments had 
primary responsibility.  
5. The new policies 1997 – 2005 
5.1 White Papers in 1997 and 2000 
DFID came into existence at a time of considerable change in international thinking about 
development.  Market economic reforms in Africa had been necessary, but they had been 
painful for the poor and had not always delivered economic growth.  While 
macroeconomic adjustment continued to be an important part of the policy prescription, 
there was a growing focus on poverty reduction, governance reform and debt relief.   
Within six months, the new department had drafted a new Government White Paper, 
Eliminating Global Poverty, which (as the title suggests) set out an ambitious agenda for 
UK development policies.
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In 2000, the Government published a further White Paper, looking specifically at the 
relationship between globalization and development.
48  It argued that globalization 
provided an opportunity to reduce poverty by making poor people and poor countries 
more productive through better access to markets, imported inputs, finance and new 
technologies; but that this opportunity would not be realized without supporting actions: 
some from rich countries and international organizations, and some within developing 
countries. 
The main policy goals set by the UK Government in the two White Papers were: 
•  Poverty reduction as the goal of development policy, with output targets 
The announcement of clear mission for poverty reduction: “We shall refocus our 
international development efforts on the elimination of poverty and 
encouragement of economic growth which benefits the poor.” The 1997 White 
Paper shifted the department’s measure of success from spending targets (e.g. 
ODA as a share of national income) to the achievement of the International 
Development Targets (which later became the Millennium Development Goals).
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14 •  An explicit focus on social sectors 
The 1997 White Paper put special emphasis on investment in social sectors as a 
means to poverty reduction; this seemed to shift the emphasis away from 
investment in productive sectors such as agriculture and infrastructure (although 
in practice this shift was already underway before 1997). 
•  Economic growth and liberalization as a means to poverty reduction 
The 2000 White Paper proclaimed the importance of economic growth as a means 
to reduce poverty. This shifted the balance back a little from the focus on social 
sectors following the 1997 White Paper. Coming as it did in the year following 
the 1999 Seattle protests, the 2000 White Paper set out the Government’s 
commitment to supporting trade liberalization, and to helping poor countries to 
benefit from, rather than resist, globalization.
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•  Development policy not aid policy 
The White Papers announced that, in addition to managing the aid program, the 
new department would develop capacity to analyze a broad range of policies 
affecting development, such as on environment, trade, agriculture, investment, 
good government and human rights, conflict prevention, debt relief, financial 
stability, drugs, migration, and cultural links.  
•  Pursuing long-term poverty reduction rather than short term commercial 
interests 
The government was clear that the aid program should not be used to pursue short 
term commercial interests, as this was thought to be at the expense of the 
effectiveness of the development budget. The Aid and Trade Provision program 
was abolished in the 1997 White Paper, albeit replaced by the possibility of 
continuing to use “mixed credits” which met development criteria but which still 
allowed aid to be tied to British contracts. In practice, mixed credits were not 
used, and they were formally ended by the 2000 White Paper which announced 
that UK aid would be completely untied.   
•  New partnerships 
The White Papers heralded a new way of working with other UK Government 
Departments, other donors and development agencies, developing countries, and 
with the private and voluntary sectors. In particular, a new aid relationship 
between Britain and the governments of developing countries was envisaged, in 
which developing countries which committed themselves to poverty reduction 
and good government could in return expect a longer-term commitment from 
DFID, more money and greater flexibility in the use of resources.   Where 
possible, DFID would move away from supporting stand-alone projects and 
dictating exactly how resources were to be used: “where we have confidence in 
the policies and budgetary allocation process and in the capacity for effective 
implementation in the partner government, we will consider moving away from 
supporting specific projects to providing resources more strategically in support 
of sector-wide programmes or the economy as a whole.” 
15 •  A more realistic assessment of Britain’s role in the international system 
The White Papers acknowledged that Britain could make only a modest 
difference on its own; but that there was much that the international community 
could do by working together.  This led to a much more positive view of the need 
to work closely with other donors.  Together with a raft of policy papers on 
particular topics, embracing collaboration with others helped DFID to become 
extremely influential throughout the development community after 1997. 
•  A new view of the role of the state in developing countries 
The  1997 White Paper criticized previous models of the role of the developing 
country governments as being either too statist, or wrongly believing in a 
“minimalist” state. It said:  “there is now an opportunity to create a new synthesis 
which builds on the role of the state in facilitating economic growth and 
benefiting the poor … .. The state is responsible not only for providing the right 
economic framework, but also for ensuring social justice: which means access to 
services such as health and education and respect for human rights.” 
•  Devolution of aid management 
The new partnership relationship was supported by increased decentralization of 
DFID’s management, in which strong field offices, operating with significant 
delegation of authority, would promote dialogue with recipient countries.   
The White Papers were important not only because of what they said, but also because 
they put on the public record clear statements of the Government’s approach to 
international development.  This had a considerable impact in an environment in which 
there had not been a White Paper for 22 years. Both White Papers were accompanied by a 
well organised publicity and communications effort to explain the new policies, both 
within the UK and abroad. 
 
5.2 Increased inter-departmental cooperation on conflict 
An example of effective joining-up across government, and DFID’s growing role in 
development policies and not just aid, was the establishment in 2001 of the Global 
Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.
51  The purpose of 
these pools was to bring together the resources of the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign 
Office and the Department for International Development, to permit a more strategic 
approach to conflict reduction.  The two pools had a budget of about $300m a year 
between them. Each was governed by a cabinet committee of Ministers from the three 
departments, chaired by the Foreign Secretary (Global Conflict Prevention Pool) and the 
Development Secretary (Africa Conflict Prevention Pool).  Each department spent money 
allocated to it under its own arrangements for accountability, once the strategy had been 
approved by the interdepartmental committee. 
Initiatives under the pool arrangements included development of new governance and 
justice systems; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of fighters into society 
and development of alternative livelihoods for them; small arms reduction programs; 
training for police, armed forces and other parts of the security sector in democratic and 
16 accountable systems which respect human rights. Most of the money was spent on 
consultancy and other non-capital support for these objectives.
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In Sierra Leone, for example, the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool coordinated a program 
to retrain and re-equip both the army and the police, the creation of a Ministry of Defence 
with civilian oversight, funding for an anti-corruption unit, and support for a truth and 
reconciliation commission.  The pools were especially successful in promoting 
coordinated activities in the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Middle East, North Africa, Nepal 
and Indonesia.  
An evaluation found that the pools promoted significantly better cooperation between the 
Departments concerned, especially in London.  The expanded pooled funds acted as an 
incentive for cooperation. Across the areas of policy, both in country and in Whitehall, 
regular formal and informal coordination and information sharing has improved.
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However, a large part of the spending on these objectives of all the participating 
departments remained outside the pools. 
Following the success of the two pools in improving interdepartmental coordination and 
joining up development policy across government, the Government also established an 
interdepartmental unit to coordinate work on post-conflict reconstruction, which would 
help countries to put in place quickly the civilian capabilities needed for a stable 
environment in the aftermath of war, so that reconstruction could begin. 
5.3 The International Development Act 2002 
In 2002, Parliament passed the International Development Act 2002, foreshadowed in the 
2000 White Paper. The Act replaced the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 
1980.  It enshrined in law the single purpose of aid spending: every development 
assistance project or program must by law either further sustainable development or 
promote the welfare of people and be likely to contribute to the reduction of poverty.
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Exceptions were aid to UK Overseas Territories, humanitarian assistance, and 
contributions to Multilateral Development Banks.  The 2002 Act made it illegal for UK 
aid to be tied to the use of British goods and services.  It clarified the purposes for which 
aid could be given to UK Overseas Territories, gave clearer legal authority for DFID’s 
development awareness work, and provided a wider range of mechanisms through which 
financial assistance could be provided. 
5.4 Better aid allocation to increase value for money 
DFID sought to increase value for money by increasing the proportion of its resources 
going to very poor countries and by increasing public scrutiny of aid allocation decisions.  
The new Department’s focus on helping countries to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals required a greater focus on poor countries because these were 
furthest from reaching the goals.  Analysis by the economists at World Bank of the 
impact of aid on economic growth implied that aid would have more impact if more of it 
were spent in countries with large numbers of poor people (as well as in countries with 
better governments).
55 During the 1990s, however, there had been a significant increase in 
the proportion of global aid going to richer countries, away from poorer countries (within 
17 a roughly constant total for global aid).  DFID decided to address this not only by 
changing the allocation of UK aid toward the poorest countries, but also by drawing 
attention to the allocation of global aid resources, which were not well targeted to 
reaching the Millennium Development Goals.   In 1998 DFID set itself an objective of 
reversing the trend of EC aid spending, an increasing proportion of which was going to 
better off countries.
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In 2002, DFID agreed with the Treasury
57 a public target that it would increase the 
proportion of DFID’s bilateral program going to low income countries from 78% to 
90%.
58  This commitment, which demanded a significant shift in resources to the poorest 
countries, became known as the “90 – 10 rule.” 
In 2003, DFID published a technical analysis which looked at the results of studies of aid 
effectiveness to predict where aid spending would have the most impact in terms of lifting 
people out of poverty, based on the recipients’ income, population, extent of poverty, and 
the quality of governance.
 59 This created a publicly available benchmark allocation of aid 
spending, optimal in its effect on poverty reduction, from which deviations would have to 
be justified. 
 
5.5 Development and security: policy since 9/11 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, UK foreign policy increased its 
focus on identifying and supporting “weak and failing states” and on removing the 
conditions that create the circumstances in which terrorists could recruit and organize. 
DFID set out its approach in a policy document in 2005.
60  It argued that lack of security 
was a significant obstacle to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, and that 
poverty and fragile states created fertile conditions for conflict and the emergence of new 
security threats including international crime and terrorism. 
Under the International Development Act 2002, DFID could not use development 
assistance to finance programs whose primary objective was tackling threats to the UK or 
global security.  The policy document explained the relationship between aid resources 
and security: “Nor will DFID open programmes in countries on the basis of UK or global 
security considerations alone – there would have to be a prior and compelling poverty 
reduction case.  But we and other development agencies can support programmes that 
enhance the human security of the poor in developing countries and, in so doing, benefit 
everyone’s safety, whether rich or poor.”  
Under the new strategy, DFID committed itself to pay greater attention to regional 
conflict and insecurity; and to countries that were pivotal to regional security; expand 
safety, security and access to justice programs; refocus governance work to promote 
accountability which promotes security; increase efforts on conflict reduction through the 
conflict prevention pools; and encourage transparency of payments for the extraction of 
natural resources. 
There was considerable pressure within the UK Government to increase DFID spending 
on reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq.  However, the 90-10 rule (see above) 
18 prevented allocations to the poorest countries from being reduced in order to 
accommodate increases in Iraq (which counted as a middle income country).  In order to 
increase spending in Iraq without breaching the 90-10 rule, DFID decided to accelerate 
planned withdrawal from other middle income countries such as Anguilla, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Honduras, Macedonia, Peru and Romania, and reduce spending in Albania, 
Bolivia, China, Jamaica, Kosovo, Russia, South Africa and Sri Lanka.
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5.6 A New Whitehall Environment 
Other government departments were predictably nervous at first about the establishment 
of a new department with a broad remit. Both the Foreign Office and the Department of 
Trade and Industry had in the past been skeptical of the development agenda, and their 
policies had reflected lower political priority on Britain’s long-term interest in reducing 
poverty in favor of shorter term commercial and political objectives. The Department of 
Trade and Industry was distrustful of the establishment of a trade policy department 
within DFID; and there were early disagreements with the Ministry of Defence over 
military training programs in Africa.
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There was inevitably some friction between the new department and the Foreign Office.  
Ms Short wrote afterwards “The Foreign Office wanted us to run projects and not 
interfere in political issues such as the ending of conflict in Africa. Africa came low down 
the list of Foreign Office priorities but they certainly did not want DFID poking its nose 
in.”
63  These disagreements mainly took the form of low-intensity bureaucratic warfare on 
issues such as the sharing of classified documents, the clearing of drafts of UN Security 
Council Resolutions, and policy documents, although there were some important 
disagreements, especially relating to the conduct of policy in Africa.
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Relations with the Foreign Office improved over time. In April 2002, a joint Foreign 
Office and DFID unit was established to manage the UK's relations with Sudan. In May 
2004, this team won an award for best Central Government team in the Public Service 
Awards.  There was effective collaboration, especially on conflict and post-conflict 
reconstruction.  In 2004 the two departments agreed an Action Plan for Collaborative 
Working mainly on logistical issues, such as sharing services in the UK and overseas;
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estates issues, especially co-location overseas; security; and IT systems, but also on 
country-level collaboration and the joint planning and delivery of shared government 
targets.
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The new Department worked closely from the outset with the Treasury.  The 
independence of the Bank of England in 1997 had liberated senior Treasury officials from 
short term worries about the conduct of monetary policy; and they were convinced that 
progress towards the reduction of world poverty was in the long-term economic interest 
of the UK.  At ministerial level, there was an especially good relationship between the 
Secretary of State for International Development (Ms Short) and the Finance Minister 
(Mr. Brown).  
Though relations with the Treasury were generally good, there were some early battles. In 
1997, DFID argued that the UK Executive Director of the World Bank should be 
appointed by DFID, separately from the UK Executive Director of the IMF. (The two 
posts were combined in a single appointment made by the Treasury).  A hard-fought 
19 compromise was eventually reached: the Secretary of State for International Development 
was designated as the UK Governor of the World Bank, in place of the Finance Minister 
who would remain Britain’s Governor of the IMF; but the roles of Executive Director of 
the World Bank and the IMF were not split and remained a Treasury appointment.
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The new Department was given the task of changing attitudes and policies across 
Whitehall, to bring development policy concerns into the mainstream of UK Government 
policy-making. This proved easier than had been expected: other Government 
departments increasingly saw the need to build support among developing countries and 
civil society organizations for their own policies with an international dimension, and 
regarded DFID as a potentially useful ally in building international support. In 1999, 
following the failure of the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, Clare Short proposed 
that DFID should publish a second White Paper, on the impact of globalisation. Although 
this touched on many areas of other departments’ responsibilities, they gave strong 
support to the idea, in part because they saw that they could better pursue their policy 
priorities if the government built a broader consensus for its approach to international 
affairs.  
The new Department built a good network of relationships across Whitehall, and 
established increasing respect for its effectiveness and for the quality of its thinking.  
Especially through the process of developing the 2000 White Paper on Globalisation, it 
formed good working relationships with the Department of Trade and Industry, Foreign 
Office, Ministry of Defence, and the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs. These relationships made a significant contribution to the evolution of policy.  
For example, the Department of Trade and Industry championed the designation of the 
new trade round, launched in Doha in November 2001, as a Development Agenda.  In 
July 2004, it published a White Paper, “Making Globalisation a Force for Good,” which 
set out a trade policy agenda concentrated on helping the poor.
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6. The aims of the changes and assessment 
This section identifies the government’s aims in making its institutional changes, and 
discusses whether they have been achieved. 
6.1 Focus on the reduction of poverty 
The Labour Party decided in opposition that the new Department should have as its single 
purpose the reduction, and eventual elimination, of world poverty; and Ms Short 
determined in opposition that the immediate objective should be to harness the global 
effort to meeting the 2015 targets.   
There were two significant motives for insisting on this focus.  The first was to improve 
value for money: using aid to support British exports or other strategic interests over the 
years had reduced the effectiveness of the aid program.  The second was managerial: by 
setting a single clear mission, Ministers and senior officials could increase the focus and 
motivation of staff. Sir John Vereker wrote afterwards, “This clarity of purpose, rapidly 
transmitted through the organisation, has been a powerful motivating, unifying and 
guiding force over the last five years.”
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20 The government was successful in narrowing the focus of development on the reduction 
of poverty, and eschewing the use of aid for commercial or strategic objectives. The 
White Papers scaled back and then abolished tied aid; and the International Development 
Act 2002 made it illegal for aid to be used for any purpose other than poverty reduction. 
However, there was some confusion about the meaning of the focus on poverty reduction.  
Some stakeholders, including some of DFID’s own staff, officials from other government 
departments and other donor countries, misunderstood it to mean that DFID would be 
focused on poverty relief – that is, addressing needs arising from poverty, rather than 
tackling the underlying causes.  DFID Ministers and senior officials always understood 
that long-term, sustainable poverty reduction involved addressing the causes of poverty, 
and they interpreted this broadly, to include investing in economic growth, conflict 
reduction, improving governance, fighting corruption, and long-term investments such as 
R&D and human development.  Nonetheless, it was some years before it was widely 
understood, including within Whitehall, that the focus on poverty reduction extended 
beyond purely humanitarian objectives. 
An instructive example of the impact of limiting the department’s resources to poverty 
reduction occurred in May 2002, when the Home Office drew up proposals to reduce the 
number of asylum seekers in the UK, which was (and remains) a very sensitive political 
issue. One proposal was that aid to some developing countries should be made 
conditional on accepting the return of asylum seekers.  The Prime Minister attached 
particular importance to cutting asylum numbers, and Downing Street advisers supported 
tying bilateral British and EU development aid for countries such as Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Turkey to commitments to take back rejected asylum seekers.
70 Clare Short opposed 
using aid funds to “try to blackmail governments into facilitating the early return of 
failed asylum seekers.”
71 She attended a Cabinet Meeting chaired by the Prime Minister 
to consider the proposals, and argued – successfully – that using aid funds in this way 
would be a breach of the new act.
72  She told the BBC, “In terms of British aid, it is 
illegal, because under law we can only spend it for development.”
73  The proposal was 
dropped. 
 
6.2 A development policy, not just an aid policy 
The Government had decided that the new department should not only be responsible for 
aid, but that it should also have a role in all the development aspects of UK policy, 
including the environment, trade, conflict, political relationships, international economy, 
and migration.  This had been an aspiration of the first Ministry of Overseas Development 
as long ago as 1964.   
The motive for including all aspects of development policy in the department’s remit was 
the recognition that there were important limits on what aid alone could achieve.   A great 
many other policies pursued by rich nations have as much, or more, impact on the 
reduction of poverty. 
Five years later, the then DFID Permanent Secretary wrote of the responsibilities of the 
department:  
21 As the Accounting Officer for the last eight years of a budget now approaching 
£3.5bn [$6bn], and directly responsible to Parliament, I have to say that I spend 
surprisingly little of my time transferring resources to developing countries. That’s 
the easy bit; but unthinking aid can do more harm than good. Most of the contents 
of my in-tray now consist of complex policy issues, spanning different government 
departments and involving many different international collaborations designed to 
improve the economy and governance of poor countries. These are areas as diverse 
as civil-military cooperation in conflict, the developing country voice in 
international trade negotiations, the coherence of European Union policies towards 
developing countries, the sustainability of debt, the impact of the global 
environment on poor people, or the ways of encouraging free and fair election.
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One example of DFID’s expanded role within Government was that it was consulted over 
the issue of arms exports licences for sales to developing countries, as were the 
Department of Trade and Industry, Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence. This did not 
mean that development interests were always placed above commercial or strategic 
decisions. In December 2001, DFID unsuccessfully opposed an arms export application 
from British Aerospace for a £28m ($48m) military radar system for Tanzania, on the 
grounds that it was unnecessary, and breached the terms of Tanzania’s debt relief.  
Following a considerable debate within Government, some of which spilled into the 
press, the Prime Minister decided in favor of the Department of Trade and Industry, and 
the sale was allowed. 
6.3 More aid 
One of the incoming Labour Government’s policy commitments was to reverse the 
decline in total aid spending, with the aim of moving towards the UN target of 0.7% of 
Gross National Income.  In practice, since the UN General Assembly agreed in 1970 
the aspiration of increasing aid to 0.7% of GDP,
 75 successive UK Governments have 
committed themselves to move towards this figure without setting a date by which it 
would be reached.
76 For example, in its February 1974 Manifesto, the Labour Party said: 
“the next Labour Government will seek to implement the United Nations Development 
Target of 0.7 per cent of GNP in official aid and will increase the aid programme to meet 
it.” In the period since 1970, the target acquired considerable political significance as a 
measure of the willingness of governments to commit resources to development. 
 
However, the new Government was also committed to maintaining the public expenditure 
plans of its predecessor, which constrained its ability to increase aid spending.  As a 
result, progress was slow in the early years, and in 2001, the DAC peer review of the UK 
aid program noted that the Government’s rhetoric had got ahead of reality:
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The government recognises that a more substantial ODA/GNI performance is 
necessary to demonstrate the United Kingdom's commitment to tackling world 
poverty and has reiterated its commitment to the United Nations' ODA/GNI target 
of 0.7%. Although the United Kingdom is one of the few DAC Members committed 
to raising its ODA volume and lifting its ODA/GNI ratio, it remains far from 
reaching this target. 
Partly as a result of commitments given by the EU in advance of the International 
Conference on Financing for Development in March 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, to 
22 reverse the decline in aid, the Government budgeted for a more rapid rise in aid from 
2002.    
 
In 2004, Hilary Benn as Secretary of State for International Development and Gordon 
Brown as Finance Minister agreed future increases in aid at a rate which would reach the 
target of 0.7% of GDP by 2013, and budgeted for those increases up to 2007-08.
78 As the 
chart below shows, this would represent the most sustained increase in aid as a share of 
national income for at least 40 years, and it was the first time that any British Government 
had set a timetable for meeting the 0.7% target. 
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6.4 Focus on the UK’s long-term interests 
An important motivation for the establishment of a separate department was to increase 
the attention paid within Government to the UK’s long-term strategic interests, so that 
these might be properly balanced against short term pressures.  For example, it was 
recognized that it was in the UK’s long-term commercial interests that Africa should 
emerge as an economically strong trading partner; and in the UK’s security interests that 
there should be reductions in poverty and inequality and improvements in governance in 
developing countries.  But these long-term interests had not always been given weight 
alongside short-term commercial and strategic concerns.  By creating a department with a 
long-term agenda for global poverty reduction, the intention was to create institutional 
pressures within government to ensure that the UK’s long-term interests were taken into 
account alongside short-term pressures. 
Eight years later, it was apparent that UK policy has been substantially realigned, partly 
as a result of the collaborative work across Whitehall of drawing up the two White 
Papers. For example, both trade policy and environment policy have changed 
significantly to take account of the UK’s long-term interests in shared economic 
prosperity and in halting the degradation of the environment. 
In 2005, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair chose two key objectives for the UK 
Presidency of the G8: the development of Africa, and the impact of Climate Change.  
23 That he chose to focus on these two long-term objectives was a testament to the extent of 
the change that had occurred in the priorities and time horizons of UK policy-makers. 
6.5 Improve the poverty impact of aid 
The reforms of development assistance were intended to improve the poverty impact of 
aid, both by improving the allocation of aid – especially by targeting aid on countries with 
poor people – and by improving the effectiveness with which it was used. 
The government untied aid completely, which was estimated to increase the effectiveness 
of aid by between 15 and 30%.
80  The government also sought to improve the  poverty 
impact of aid by shifting resources towards poor countries, with the introduction of the 
target that 90% of aid should go to low income countries, and by the use of an explicit aid 
allocation model. 
By 2003, DFID estimated that the poverty reduction impact of a marginal dollar of aid 
had quadrupled since 1990, though some of this was due to changes in aid levels and 
improvements in governance in developing countries.  As a result of improvements in aid 
allocation, DFID’s own estimates showed that it raised more people out of poverty for an 
extra $1m than the donor average (it ranked third highest among bilateral donors).
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However, the effectiveness of aid depends not only on where it is used, but also on how it 
is spent. Changes in development assistance which were intended to make aid more 
effective also had the effect of making it more difficult to measure the cost-effectiveness 
of those aid programs. For example, the move away from supporting individual projects 
and providing financial support more generally to governments committed to poverty 
reduction, and increased collaboration and pooling with other donors, were based on 
evidence that aid could be more effective when delivered this way. However, these same 
changes also made it more difficult to attribute particular outputs and outcomes to the UK 
aid program, so reducing the availability of direct evidence for the effectiveness of aid.    
6.6 Focus on the causes of poverty and not just the symptoms 
The new department decided to focus on the causes of poverty and not just its symptoms, 
in order to take a long-term view of achieving its mission. This brought the new 
department explicitly into new policy arenas, such as conflict prevention, trade, 
environment, governance and security, with a view to identifying and addressing the 
causes of poverty. In one sense, the change was less pronounced than it might appear: the 
previous Overseas Development Administration had been engaged in many of these 
issues.  However, the department’s explicit broad responsibilities for development and 
not just aid, and its representation in Cabinet, changed government and public perceptions 
of its role, and enabled it to act with considerably greater confidence and effect in these 
areas. 
An example of the way in which DFID began to look at the causes of poverty was the 
strategy of considering Drivers of Change, which sought to ground development 
programs in an understanding of the economic, social and political factors that either 
drive or block change within a country.
 82  The goal of tackling the causes of poverty also 
led DFID to expand its work on institution-building and governance reform, security and 
24 access to justice and governance programs.  DFID and the Department of Trade and 
Industry together argued for a “development round” for the Doha trade talks, and for 
reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy.  With the Ministry of Defence and 
Foreign Office, it greatly expanded work on preventing and ending conflict, and on 
investment in post-conflict societies.  
6.7 Increasing leverage to increase impact 
The Government made a deliberate effort to work with and through other bilateral and 
multilateral donors, to leverage the impact of the UK’s contribution to development. 
From 1997, DFID consciously moved away from highlighting UK contributions to 
particular programs (for example, the Union Flag was no longer stencilled on to bags of 
food aid).  In part, the intention of this change was that it would give it more 
opportunities to work across the international system as a whole, with other like-minded 
donors, the European Community and the international financial institutions.  Seeking 
publicity for the UK’s own contribution internationally, it was felt, had been a distraction 
from, and in some cases an obstacle to, effective collaboration with partners. This was 
accompanied by an increased effort within the UK to explain the purpose and 
effectiveness of the aid program, to sustain support as it became less visible on the 
ground. 
One example of the effort to increase leverage was the Government’s willingness to 
channel resources through multilateral institutions where they are effective, such as 
through the World Bank. The UK gave a higher share of aid as multilateral assistance 
than the DAC average. Over 1996-2000 DFID provided on average 41% of its aid 
through multilateral organizations compared with 36% for all DAC donors and 25% for 
the US. (There is no clear relationship between size of donor and the multilateral share.) 
An increased willingness to work with others also led to a very large number of policy 
collaborations with the World Bank.   
In another example, from 2001 DFID’s Vietnam program was established with a 
complete ban on purely bilateral aid projects.  All aid was provided in support of projects 
or programs conducted by or with other development partners, especially the World 
Bank.  This approach was perceived to leverage other resources, help to focus other 
organisations on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, discipline 
project design by requiring all interventions to secure the support of other agencies, and 
reduce transactions costs for the Government of Vietnam. 
However, as the chart below shows, although the share of aid going to multilateral 
institutions remained relatively high, it fell at a time when the department was advocating 
working through multilateral institutions where possible.   


























6.7 Evidence-based policy making, focusing on outcomes and transparency 
In line with a new approach across the UK Government, DFID set itself the task of basing 
policy on evidence, focusing on outcomes rather than inputs, and increasing the 
transparency of policy making and use of resources.  Arguably, it was one of the more 
successful government departments at ensuring that policies were firmly based on 
evidence. 
DFID employed a large number of technical specialists, from economists to 
anthropologists, and experts in health, engineering, education, statistics, trade, conflict, 
environment, population and governance.  One important result of DFID’s commitment 
to using evidence was a consistent attention since 1997 to supporting the important, but 
politically unglamorous, process of building capacity for the collection and analysis of 
statistics in developing countries. 
In line with the aim of basing policy on evidence, both White Papers were the result of 
extensive consultation with experts outside government, including academics and non-
governmental organizations, and were backed by an array of specially-commissioned 
analyses.   
The 1997 White Paper shifted the department’s measurement of its performance towards 
the UK’s contribution to meeting the Millennium Development Goals, rather than on 
input-based measures of the UK’s contribution.  However, in common with other 
organizations, DFID did not satisfactorily resolve the tension, on the one hand wanting to 
increase the importance of measuring outcomes, and on the other hand needing evidence 
to attribute those outcomes to the UK’s own contribution.  (It was easier to attribute the 
26 UK’s contribution to inputs, such as total aid given, or to outputs such as schools built, 
than it was to outcomes which are the effect of the country’s own efforts as well as the 
combined effects of all the donors.) 
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Development policy became markedly more transparent. Country Assistance Plans – 
which formed the basis of DFID country programs – were published for the first time. 
Most project documents were made available online through the AIDA database;
85 and 
from 2005, all project documents were opened to public scrutiny under the UK’s Freedom 
of Information Act.  
6.9 Greater public awareness and political focus 
Finally, it was an explicit aim of the reforms of UK development assistance to increase 
the political focus on development, by appointing a high-profile Cabinet Minister to lead 
the department.   
The 1997 White Paper called for increased public understanding of global mutual 
dependence and the need for international development. It called for every child to be 
educated about development issues, so that they could understand the key global 
considerations that would shape their lives.  DFID began a low-key but effective public 
awareness campaign.  This included, for example, working with the Department for 
Education to include “global citizenship” in the new national curriculum, and providing 
materials and support for teacher training colleges to enable teachers to incorporate 
development into their teaching.  In 2004, the UK Government teamed up with the Rough 
Guide, publishers of travel books, to produce a Rough Guide to a Fairer World, which 
explained what members of the public could do if they wanted to become more involved 
in supporting developing countries.
86 
One effect of these efforts was a steady rise in the proportion of the British public who 
said that they were “very concerned” about development, from 17% in 1999 to 26% in 
2004.
87 
Once consequence of the move to greater collaboration with other donors, and greater use 
of resource transfer to recipient governments rather than project aid, was that UK aid was 
less directly visible, and so less likely to generate a strong sense of ownership in the 
United Kingdom.  To avoid a decline in support for aid, the Government considered it 
important to explain carefully the rationale for the policy change and highlight the 
increased impact of British aid that it was expected to bring. 
The Labour Government had, at least at first, an unexpectedly testy relationship with 
many of the Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  Clare Short as Secretary of State 
for International Development felt that the development and environment NGOs had an 
agenda that would not help developing countries to take advantage of globalization, and 
that funding British NGOs was a “short term political distraction.”  She wrote: “All of 
these groups were well intentioned by the most generous possible funding for the best 
possible UK NGOs was not capable of bringing about the massive reductions of poverty 
that were needed.”
88  Relationships with NGOs improved over time, in part because of the 
introduction of Partnership Programme Agreements (PPAs) to fund NGOs on the basis of 
27 their strategic objectives. PPAs are long-term funding agreements that do not restrict the 
use of those funds to particular projects or activities.
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7. Future challenges for DFID 
By 2005, enormous progress had been made by the new Department for International 
Development, but considerable challenges remained.  In the 2005 edition of the Center 
for Global Development’s authoritative, quantitative annual study of the how the policies 
of rich countries help or hinder poor countries, the United Kingdom ranked about half 
way, 10
th out of 21 countries, equal to Canada, just below Germany and well behind the 
Scandinavian countries and Australia and New Zealand.
90  A relatively strong 
performance on aid, trade and investment was undermined by weak and deteriorating 
performance on policies such as migration and security.  (The United Kingdom was, 
however, with Spain and Sweden, the joint fastest improver since the index began in 
2003.) 
The Department for International Development faces a number of continuing challenges, 
which will require it to: 
•  Maintain a tight focus on the department’s core strengths, and limit the number 
of countries to which Britain gives bilateral aid. Prioritization is more difficult at 
a time of rapid increases in the aid budget; and arguably one of DFID’s 
weaknesses is that it tries to do too much. 
•  Lock in the improvements in development policy made following the end of the 
Cold War, which enabled aid to be allocated to the poorest countries where it 
would have most impact, and reduced the distortion of aid by short-term strategic, 
political and commercial interests.  Since 9/11 and the increased focus on 
security, there will be increasing pressure to use all the Government’s resources in 
the fight against terrorism. DFID has, so far, been largely successful in sustaining 
the argument that the UK’s longer term interests, including its security interests, 
are best served by preserving the focus of aid on poverty reduction.
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•  Restrain, and perhaps reverse, the growth in bilateral aid, by ensuring that the 
bulk of the anticipated increases in aid are channeled through multilateral 
institutions, which is more efficient both for donors and for recipients; and also by 
increasing investments in global and regional public goods, such as scientific 
research, early warning systems, and regional infrastructure, which are currently 
under-funded. 
•  Within bilateral aid, make more progress on implementing DFID’s rhetorical 
commitments to increasing program aid, which increases the recipient’s control 
of resources, so enhancing effectiveness and accountability, and reduces the 
administrative burden of projects. 
•  Improve the department’s approach to the transfer of knowledge and skills, 
based on evidence about what works; and so reduce the proportion of spending on 
technical cooperation and consultants (which, although declining since the late 
1990s, remains high by international standards). 
28 •  Expand DFID’s influence on sensitive areas of policy which have a significant 
effect on poor countries, including migration policies, corruption and lack 
transparency by transnational corporations, the configuration of armed forces for 
humanitarian relief and conflict prevention. 
•  Build stronger public support for the Government’s role in international 
development.  In an annual survey of UK opinion, fewer than a fifth of people 
identify the governments of rich countries as making a major contribution to the 
reduction of international poverty, compared with two thirds who think that 
international charities do so.
92  This remains a precarious basis for DFID’s long-
term survival and weight within Government. 
8. Lessons from the UK experience 
 
This final section contains some personal reflections on the main components of the 
reforms, which I see as having been largely successful.  
8.1 What were the components of success?  
The main ingredients in the successful reform of UK development assistance have been: 
•  Combining responsibility for all aid in a single Government department.  
This has been the case in the UK since 1964 and has made an important 
contribution to both the coherence and cost-effectiveness of British aid that other 
countries would do well to emulate.  
•  The establishment of an integrated development ministry, with influence over a 
range of government policies that affect development, has had a significant effect 
on the conduct of policy.  While development interests will not always take 
precedence over other government objectives, they should at least be identified 
and taken into account in the design and execution of broader government 
objectives. 
•  Setting a clear purpose and focus on outcomes.  DFID has been able to resist 
short-term political pressures from changing its long-term strategy. This is easier 
said than done: it requires powerful political leadership to prevent aid budgets 
being diverted to other priorities.  The appointment of a separate Cabinet 
Minister, and legislation about the use to which aid resources could be put, has 
enabled the department to resist other pressures. 
•  Building an understanding among policy-makers and commentators of the 
relationship between long-term interests and short-term interests of the 
country.   
•  Recognising that development is impossible without security; and security is 
impossible without development.  This mutual interdependence has profound 
implications for Government institutions and priorities.   
29 •  Acceptance that more can be achieved through partnerships with others, and 
through leverage of the multilateral system, even if this means a less distinctive 
high profile for the development program.  This includes integrated management 
of bilateral and multilateral aid to secure the synergies and ensure coherence.  
 
8.2 How did it happen? 
As with most successful revolutions, the changes succeeded in part because they found 
resonance in a long evolution of thinking, and in part because they captured a the mood of 
the moment. The unified management of aid by a single government department has been 
a long-standing virtue of the UK system, dating back to 1964, which has been unusual 
internationally. The UK has also consistently argued over many years the importance of 
assistance to the poorest countries, although its own aid program did not always reflect 
that priority.  Many of the changes that the UK introduced in 1997 and afterwards were in 
line with a new international mood that while increases in aid were an important part of 
the development agenda, it was essential also to pay attention to the broader set of 
policies that affect developing countries. 
Other elements that enabled these changes to happen and to be sustained were: 
•  High profile political leadership for a new approach to development.  The Prime 
Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer were willing to back the new 
Department, and Clare Short  provided a strong focus for it. One external 
commentator wrote:  “What drove the difference? In a word, leadership.  Short 
imposed focus and drive on her organizations.  She believed that DFID should – 
and could – make a real difference.  She recruited the best and the brightest from 
the UK and abroad. She encouraged discussion and debate. She demanded 
excellence.”
93  Subsequent Cabinet Ministers have ensured that DFID retains a 
high political profile.  
•  A supportive political environment for improvements in the use of aid, 
buttressed by investment in public education and development awareness 
campaigns. 
•  A supportive environment within the rest of government, including a recognition 
that reorganising responsibilities and powers between government agencies is not 
a zero sum game.  British government departments learned that they could be 
more effective and influential if they worked together to deliver coherent policy 
objectives than if they spent their time and resources fighting for turf. Other 
government departments were persuaded that they had something to gain from the 
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30 Appendix 1: The Pergau Dam 
 
The Pergau Dam is a hydroelectric dam in Malaysia, near the border with Thailand. The 
dam is the largest aid project ever financed by the United Kingdom.   
In March 1988, the then Defence Secretary, Sir George Younger, signed a “defence 
export Protocol” with Malaysia which committed the UK government to “bring to bear 
the resources of its MOD [Ministry of Defence] in order to grant certain facilities, 
including: - aid in support of non-military aspects under the programme.” Lord Younger 
agreed that Malaysia would receive 20 per cent of the value of the arms sales in the form 
of aid. 
In November 1988 an application for aid through the ATP for the Pergau dam was made 
to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) by a consortium of British companies, led 
by Balfour Beatty, which had close connections to the governing Conservative Party. In 
March 1989, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, visited Downing 
Street. The consortium and the British Government wanted to make an aid offer on the 
dam during this visit.  In order to meet this timetable, the ODA had to rush through a two-
person, two-day project appraisal and telephone an initial report on which Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher could make an oral offer of a £68.25 million grant, based on a contract 
price of £316 million.   
An offer of ATP assistance was made on the Pergau project in April 1989 (on the £316 
million price) and renewed in October 1989 and April 1990 while commercial 
negotiations continued. But in October 1990 it was not renewed, as the ODA and DTI had 
sent a joint mission to survey the Malaysian power sector and the possibilities for other 
projects which might attract British companies. That review concluded that completing 
the Pergau project in 1997, as proposed, would mean a significant cost penalty for 
Malaysian electricity consumers because electricity could be produced much more 
cheaply by gas turbine power stations. By the time the contracts for the dam were signed 
in July 1991, the price had risen to £417 million. Nevertheless, on a further visit to 
London, in December 1990, Dr Mohamad confirmed that the Pergau project would go 
ahead. Officials at the ODA and DTI continued to work on alternative power projects. 
In February 1991, Sir Tim Lankester, the most senior civil servant in the ODA, formally 
advised the Minister for Overseas Development that funding the Pergau Dam project 
''would not be consistent with policy statements by ministers to Parliament about the 
basic objectives of the aid programme''.   
Ministers at the two departments responsible for the ATP program, Lynda Chalker and 
Trade Minister, Tim Sainsbury, were opposed to providing support for the dam. But 
others, including Britain's High Commissioner to Malaysia, Sir Nicholas Spreckley, and 
Alan Clark, then Minister for Defence Procurement, argued that to withdraw support for 
Pergau “would have an adverse impact on UK relations with Malaysia in general and on 
the defence sales relationship in particular”. The Prime Minister, John Major, agreed with 
their assessment. In July 1991, the then Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, overruled the 
objections and authorised expenditure from the aid budget of £234 million (about $400 
million).  
31 Once the aid offer had been made, the cost to the ODA more than doubled because the 
ATP budget of about £100 million per year could not fund the £70 million for Pergau's 
second year without crowding out other ATP projects. So, instead of £108 million in 
grants over five years, the project was financed by a 14-year, very low-interest loan, at a 
cost of £234 million.  
At the time, officials denied any link between British aid and arms sales to Malaysia.  The 
Prime Minister’s office described the timing of the arms sales as “merely a coincidence”.   
In January 1994 Sir Tim Lankester gave evidence to a House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee enquiry, and it was clear that there had in fact been a link between 
the decision to give aid and the arms sales.  As a result of this evidence, Douglas Hurd 
admitted that there had been a “brief entanglement” between aid and arms sales from 
March to June 1988. He claimed that this had been ended by Sir George Younger's letter 
of 28 June 1988 to the Malaysian Finance Minister saying that “the linking of aid to 
projects” would not be possible. On the same day, the British High Commissioner in 
Kuala Lumpur also wrote to the Finance Minister, offering up to £200 million in ATP and 
export credit support for future contracts. This amount was the same as the aid expected 
to accompany the £1 billion of arms sales.    
A judicial review brought by an NGO led to a High Court ruling in November 1994 that 
aid for Pergau was in violation of the Overseas Development Act 1980, which allows the 
Foreign Secretary to make payments “for the purpose of promoting the development or 
maintaining the economy of a country or territory outside the UK or the welfare of its 
people.”.  The High Court ruled that the project was not of economic or humanitarian 
benefit to the Malaysian people. 
Following the ruling, the Foreign Secretary announced that the Government would meet 
its contractual obligation to pay for the three-quarters-built dam. On 13 December 1994  
he told the House of Commons that he would not appeal against the Court ruling, but the 
ODA would not be reimbursed for the £24.37 million unlawfully spent on the Pergau 
project between July 1991 and March 1994. 
Sources: 
Memoirs, Douglas Hurd (2003) 
The Association for International Water and Forest Studies (FIVAS) 
(http://www.fivas.org/rettsskr/pergau7.htm) 
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